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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
First of all, I want to say that Professor Govier contributed to the study of conceptual 
structures by writing a very insightful and simulating paper about the dichotomous 
framework and the ways uses of that framework may go awry. The case of claims of 
dichotomy (exclusive disjunctions) illustrates how the choices of logical tools are 
connected, sometimes quite unexpectedly, with larger issues about human thought and 
culture. In the history of logic there has been a long-term, rather unfortunate, prejudice in 
favor of the exclusiveness of disjunctions. As Else Barth noted (1974, p. 418), 
“practically all traditional logicians regarded the notion of exclusive disjunction as a 
more important logical tool than that of inclusive disjunction.” Thus, there is a particular 
value attached to getting clear about the mode of thought here analysed by Professor 
Govier. 
 In what follows I shall briefly comment on three issues: the ways one may argue 
fallaciously starting from an inclusive disjunction (A v B); the ways one may do it 
starting from an exclusive disjunction (A # B); and the ways one may block, at an early 
stage, the slippery journey described at the end of the paper. 
 
2.  INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION 
 
Professor Govier mentions two interesting ways of reasoning fallaciously from  an  
premise A v B (or, for all x: Ax v Bx). One way would be to start from a disjunctive 
premise that is flawed (but superficially plausible), the other to use a fallacious rule of 
inference, in particular one that takes the inclusive disjunction to yield the same 
conclusions as an exclusive one (both errors could be combined).  
The first case would fall under the fallacy of problematic premise, but Govier 
rightly points out that, since the premise flaw could be covered up by the trappings of 
rigorous logic in what follows (say a disjunctive syllogism or a constructive dilemma), 
one may in some cases speak of a quasi-logical argument. This, of course, does not mean 
that there is anything wrong with these logical rules of inference. But the point is that also 
valid rules of logic can be misused. When logic is misused in this way, covering up a 
flawed inclusive disjunction, this may be called a fallacy of false dilemma. 
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The second case could in some instances, where the linguistic conventions about  
the ways to express inclusive and exclusive disjunctions permit so, be construed as a case 
of equivocation. However, the inference from inclusive to exclusive disjunction being 
invalid, it may also be construed as a non sequitur. In fact, the case adduced by Govier (A 
v B, B; therefore – A) much resembles the one of  asserting the consequent (a standard 
example of non sequitur), since A v B is equivalent to – A > B. This invalid inference 
may be confused with another, valid, inference that one obtains by substituting an 
exclusive disjunction for the inclusive one (A # B, B; therefore – A). This latter rule of 
inference was known to the Stoics and bears the traditional name of modus ponendo 
tollens. 
 
3. EXCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION 
 
With exclusive disjunctions, or claims of dichotomy, we have again the same ways of  
reasoning fallaciously: the disjunctive premise could be flawed or the rule of inference 
used could be (or both). Govier concentrates on the ways the premise could be flawed. 
She distinguishes six ways in which this could come about. The first three ways are ways 
in which the claim of dichotomy could actually be false (as I would say), whereas the 
other ways are ways in which the claim could fail to be true, or to be knowable, without 
being false. 
 Now, since a dichotomous claim can be written as the conjunction of a claim of 
exhaustiveness and a claim of exclusiveness, it can be false because of a lack of 
exhaustiveness, or a lack of exclusiveness or both (Govier’s (i), (ii), and (iii)). This is true 
for the cases where we consider claims that are modalized (necessarily (A # B)), or 
generalized (for all x: Ax # Bx), or both (necessarily for all x: Ax # Bx). For instance, 
‘necessarily for all x: Ax # Bx’ can be false because ‘necessarily for all x: Ax v Bx’ is 
false (lack of exhaustiveness), or because ‘necessarily for all x: – (Ax . Bx)’  is false (lack 
of exclusiveness), or because both are false. However, if no modalization or 
generalization is present (A # B), the last possibility is excluded, since A v B 
(exhaustiveness) and – (A . B) (exclusiveness) can not both be false. So, in that case, 
there are only two ways to be false, corresponding to those two lines in the truth table 
where the exclusive disjunction is false. 
Clearly Govier includes the generalized case, since she seems to be concerned 
primarily with predicates, rather than statements (cf. her note 5). It is not so clear whether 
she also has the modalized cases in mind, though her use of ‘must’ and ‘can’ suggests 
that she does (but formulas are unmodalized). Somehow the importance of modality 
seems a bit underplayed. 
 Govier goes on to point out three other ways a dichotomous claim could be false. 
I must admit that I see no other ways it could be false, though I am happy to agree that 
there are other ways in which it could fail to be true. So perhaps our only difference 
regards the use of the word ‘false’. Govier’s fourth way (ill-formedness) makes, I would 
say, the dichotomy indefinite, rather than true or false. I’m thinking here in terms of a 
three-valued logic, where statements are assigned the value ‘indefinite’ in cases of 
vagueness or referential failure (Blau 1978). Ill-formedness (lack of clarity) can be seen 
as a special case of vagueness. The same holds of Govier’s fifth way ( off-spectrumness), 
which is a kind of category mistake and, therefore, can also be classified as a kind of 
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vagueness (Blau 1978, p. 57). These are important ways in which dichotomous 
statements can fail to be true.  
About Govier’s sixth case (indeterminacy), however, I disagree. There are of 
course philosophical positions in which being true is dependent upon being specifiable or 
knowable, but common sense points in another direction. For instance, if from a huge urn 
filled with marbles I shovel out about a thousand and then immediately shovel them back 
in, before even the Rain Man can count them, or anyway before anyone has in fact 
counted them, the parity (odd or even) of the number of marbles that have been out is 
completely unknowable (according to common sense). Yet, it is (also according to 
common sense) true to say that this number was either odd or even. The speckled hen 
case may be a case of vagueness again, and hence a case of indefiniteness, but in many 
cases of indeterminacy dichotomous claims can be true, though it be beyond us to 
ascertain which of the disjuncts is the true one.  
 
4. GETTING ON THE SLIPPERY JOURNEY 
 
Towards the end of her paper Professor Govier develops a fascinating series of steps 
going from mere difference to de-humanization. Here it is important to investigate the 
logical means that may enable us to criticize and block this “slippery journey” at various 
stages. I shall comment only on the early stages: from difference to exclusive disjunction. 
Notice first that if we restrict ourselves to two-valued logic and neither modality nor 
generalization is involved, difference (which would have to be expressed by – (A iff B), 
this being the denial of extensional equality) and exclusive disjunction (A # B) are 
logically equivalent. So the step from difference to dichotomy is actually valid for this 
case.  In the other cases, where we have modality or generalization or both, one needs 
first to establish either the exclusiveness (leading to “early exclusion”) and then the 
exhaustiveness, or one has to do that in the opposite order. The critic may, of course try 
to criticize the very first step, or even that there is a difference. Otherwise, if one moves 
illegitimately from early exclusion to exhaustiveness, this may be criticized as an “error 
of contrariety” (see paper, p. 4); if one moves illegitimately from (early) exhaustiveness 
to exclusiveness, this may be criticized as the error of mistaking an inclusive disjunction 
for an exclusive one (p. 2). So, in both cases, Professor Govier’s paper provides a way for 
the critic to try and block the slippery slope at an early stage. This is good, for if one can 
block it at an early stage there is no need to get involved in discussions about what errors 
or prejudices come in at the later stages. Only when the dichotomy has been established, 
need the critic consider further options. 
 
link to paper
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